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Abstract
We investigate mean-field games from the point of view of a large num-
ber of indistinguishable players, which eventually converges to infinity. The
players are weakly coupled via their empirical measure. The dynamics
of the states of the individual players is governed by a non-autonomous
pure jump type semi group in a Euclidean space, which is not necessarily
smoothing. Investigations are conducted in the framework of non-linear
Markov processes. We show that the individual optimal strategy results
from a consistent coupling of an optimal control problem with a forward
non-autonomous dynamics. In the limit as the number N of players goes
to infinity this leads to a jump-type analog of the well-known non-linear
McKean-Vlasov dynamics. The case where one player has an individual
preference different from the ones of the remaining players is also covered.
The two results combined reveal an epsilon-Nash Equilibrium for the N -
player games.
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1 Introduction
Mean-field game theory is a type of dynamic Game theory. The indistinguish-
able individual agents are coupled with each other by their individual dynamics
through the empirical measure. Moreover, the objective for each player is a func-
tion not only of her own preference and decision but also of the decisions of the
other players via the mean-field. Mathematically seen it is a combination be-
tween mean-field theory and the theory of stochastic differential games describe
a control problem with a large number N of agents by letting N tend to infinity.
The main idea of mean-field game theory is to designate an approximate form of
equilibrium between the symmetric agents’ strategies while the number of agents
goes to infinity. The impact of the individual decisions of the other agents is
becoming extremely weak compared to the overall impact as N increases. The
limiting model emerges from the fact that the dynamics of the individual players
decouple and each player constructs her strategy from her own state and from
the state of the mass of an infinite number of co-agents of hers which is called
the mean-field approach.
The mean-field approach in the context of differential games has been indepen-
dently developed in three mathematical settings. The term mean-field games was
introduced By J.-M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions in a series of papers, see [14] and [24]
and the references therein, using nonlinear PDE’s. Independently M. Huang, P.
Caines, Malhame´ developed a similar approach, see [15] in the general setting
of stochastic processes. They use the term Nash Certainty Equivalence for con-
structing the mean-field games via a converging iteration of well defined random
dynamics and control problems. The contributions [6, 7] deepen and extend the
results for diffusion processes. V.Kolokotsov et. al. investigate mean-field games
theory in the setting non-linear Markov Processes where a 1/N estimate appears,
see [18]. For work on games with discrete state space see Gomes et. al. [13] and
Basna et. al. [3].
There are numerous important applications of mean-field games in many areas, of
which we only mention a few. Caines and collaborators investigate the application
to large communication as well as electricity networks and analyse the behavior
of the large population dynamics. The group of researchers collaborating with
Lions examine applications for the oil industry and in the analysis of pedestrian
crowds. Carmona et al. focus on inter-banking trading.
The investigations in this work are carried out in the framework of non-linear
Markovian propagators, respectively time inhomogeneous non-linear Feller pro-
cesses, which was developed by Vassili Kolokoltsov [19] [20]. We focus on propa-
gators related to processes of pure jump type with finite intensity measure in a
finite dimensional Euclidean space, that can be identified with the possible deci-
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sions of the players. This way we generalize results obtained in [3]. In analogy
to [3] our starting point of the so called closed-loop construction including an
optimal control is the following backward Kolmogorov equation for N players:
∂fs
∂s
+ AN [s,x, µN , u]fs(x) = 0, 0 ≤ t < s ≤ T (1.1)
fT (x) = Φ(x), x ∈ R
Nd,
where f is a function from the domain D(AN [s,x, µ, u]), µN := 1
N
∑N
i=1 δxi is a
normalized sum of Dirac measures in Rd, and the parameter u ∈ Rm represents
a control law. Finally, for x ∈ RNd, N ∈ N and t ≤ s ≤ T the generator AN is
of the form
A
N [s,x, µN , u]fs(x) =
N∑
i=1
AN,i[s, xi, µ
N , u]fs(x), (1.2)
where the operators
AN,i[s, xi, µ
N , u]fs(x) :=
∫
Rd
(fi′(s, y)− fi′(s, xi)) ν(s, xi, µ
N , u, dy), (1.3)
on C∞(R
Nd), referring to distinct indistinguishable agents or players i, act on
the component xi ∈ R
d in the argument of the function f only, while all other
components of f are kept fix. This leads us to introduce the functions fi′ ∈
C∞(R
d) such that fi′(xi) = fx′i(xi) = f(x), where the vector x
′
i ∈ R
(N−1)d is
kept fix, and x′i is derived from the vector x by removing the component xi.
The particle limit being anticipated, the empirical mean µN is replaced by an
external constant measure valued parameter ρ ∈ M := M (Rd), which is the
set of finite measures, representing the limiting distribution µt in (3.1), which
solves the kinetic equation. Moreover, the individual dynamics split and we may
identify the operators AN,i with the integral operator
A[s, xi, ρ, u]fi′(xi) := A
N,i[s, xi, ρ, u]f(x) (1.4)
on C∞(R
d). We finally drop the index i alltogether. Adopting a notation from
physics we shall say the operator AN describes the dynamics of the N -mean-field
model.
As mentioned above the construction involves a mean-field type limit consistent
with a given optimal control problem. This is a particular example of measure
valued limits from the theory of interacting particle systems. A key role within
the toolbox of this theory plays the injection from the equivalence class SRNd of
vectors in RNd, which are identical up to a permutation of players, into the set
of point measures in Rd, defined by
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x = (x1, . . . , xN) −→
1
N
(δx1 + . . .+ δxN ) . (1.5)
More precisely, for arbitrary N ∈ N the mapping constitutes a bijection between
SRNd and the subset PNδ := {µ ∈ M | µ =
1
N
∑N
k=1 δxk} of normalized sum of
Dirac measures in Rd and the spaces may be identified. For each natural number
N the space of symmetric real valued functions on RNd which are invariant under
component-wise permutations of their arguments is equivalent with the space of
real valued functions on SRNd.
The operator AN [s,x, µN , u] on C∞(R
Nd) with µN := 1
N
δx generates a time in-
homogeneous jump Feller (Markov) process XN = (XN,1, . . . , XN,N), in RNd and
the operator A[s, x, µN , u] generates a time inhomogeneous jump Feller (Markov)
process X in Rd, see Section 2.
Due to the symmetry of the generator AN in (1.2) with respect to permutations
of the players, the dynamics for one representative amongst N indistinguishable
agents and hence the corresponding time inhomogeneous process is described by
XN,1 = XN,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , in Rd. Formally the objective for each of the N players
is to find the value function
V N(t, x;µN≥t) = sup
γ
Ex
[∫ T
t
J(s,XN,1s , µ
N
s , γ(s,X
N,1
s ;µ
N
s )) ds+ V
T (XN,1T , µ
N
T )
]
(1.6)
on [0, T ] × Rd, i.e. to maximize her expected payoff over a suitable class of
admissible feedback control processes {γ(s,XN,1s ;µ
N
s ) | 0 ≤ s ≤ T} ∈ U , with
µNs =
1
N
∑N
i δXN,is . Here the cost function J : [0, T ]×R
d×PNδ ×U → R and the
terminal cost function V T : Rd×PNδ → R, as well as the final time T are given.
Suitable conditions on the cost function are given in the main part of the paper.
Anticipating the existence of a limiting mean-field µ = {µs ∈ M |0 ≤ s ≤ T},
for each N , an explicit expression for the value function is derived by dynamic
programming as solution of the HJB equation. In fact, for admissible feed-
back control processes the HJB equation is well posed. Moreover, the solu-
tion coincides with the value function and the resulting optimal feedback con-
trol function γˆN(t,x;µ≥t) is unique for given start value x ∈ R
Nd and given
µ≥t = {µt ∈ M |t ≤ s ≤ T}. In addition, Regularity in the parameters is shown,
See Section 4 below.
As the number N of players tends to infinity the dynamics of the representative
player depends on her own state and the overall respectively limiting distribution
of the other players only. Consequently the limiting kinetic equation for the
mean-field with a particular choice of the control law is motivated by the weak
form of the one player evolution which reads:
(g,
d
ds
µs)Rd = (A[s, µs, ϕ(s)]g, µs)Rd, µ(0) = µ, (1.7)
4
for arbitrary g ∈ C∞(R
d) and a finite measure µs ∈ M as solution for 0 ≤ s ≤ T .
The Ansatz will be verified by the limiting procedure at the last section of the
paper. A proof for the uncontrolled system maybe found in [28].
Existence, uniqueness, and regularity of a non-linear flow to the kinetic equation
is shown. Moreover, the Koopman-type propagator to the non-linear flow is
investigated and exploited to estimate the difference between the non-linear flow
given by the kinetic equation and a representation of the linear N -mean-field flow
on PNδ ⊂ M given by the identification (1.5). The construction exhibits the order
of convergence to depend on the regularity of the kernel and the dimension of the
underlying Euclidean space.
Mean-field game consistency is said to hold when the number of players N goes
to infinity, symmetry being granted, if the problem reduces to the dynamic of
the states of a decoupled single player and a pair of two coupled equations, the
solutions of which leave each other invariant. The first one is the forward kinetic
equation, describing the evolution of the distribution of the population. The
second one is a backward Hamilton Jacobi Bellman Equation associated with the
value function
V (t, x;µ≥t) = sup
γ
Ex
[∫ T
t
J(s,Xs, µs, γ(s,Xs;µ≥s)) ds+ V
T (XT , µT )
]
(1.8)
on [0, T ]×Rd, where the linear dynamics, represented by the process X is given
by the Kolmogorov backward equation with generator A[s, x, µs, γ(s)] with ex-
ternal measure parameter {µt|0 ≤ t ≤ T}, which anticipates the mean-field. The
corresponding Markov process X describes the states of one player in the mean-
field limit. The value function V stands for the limiting control problem. This
is shown by a fixed point argument, the mean-field solving (3.1) and the optimal
feedback control being the fixpoints. In analogy to the control problem for N
players, there exists a unique optimal feedback control law γˆ for the optimal pay-
off V while µt is an external parameter. For the proof of an approximate Nash
equilibrium a tagged player with a different preference is introduced while using
the optimal control γˆ given by the fixpoint theorem otherwise. The difference
of the value functions V N and V for modified model with the additional tagged
player reveals the bound ε for the approximate Nash equilibrium.
We conclude the introduction with an overview of how the paper is organized. In
Section 2 the dynamics of the game is introduced, in particular the Markovian
propagator or time inhomogeneous semi group and the continuous in time Markov
processes for one representative player. In Section 3 the N mean-field as well as
the limiting dynamics and the generator of the corresponding Koopman-type
propagator are set up. The sensitivity analysis for the associated N mean-field
control problems is discussed in Section 4. In the subsequent Section 5 the limit
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when the number of players tends to infinity is investigated. Bounds for the
approximation error are derived for the dynamics as well as for the value functions.
Finally, the ε-Nash equilibrium is established.
2 Preliminary Results
A family of mappings U r,s, T0 ≤ r ≤ s ≤ T , in a set S is called a propagator in
S if Us,s = idS for all s ∈ [T0, T ] and the following cocycle property holds:
U t,s = U t,rU r,s (2.1)
for T0 ≤ t ≤ r ≤ s ≤ T . Here U
t,rU r,s is to be interpreted as the composition of
mappings.
For linear propagators, respectively evolutions see [9] Chapter 2, it means the
application of linear operators, see [2] Chapter 3 and [9] Chapter 2. In the
particular case when the propagator is given by a non-autonomous jump Feller
process X on Rd, i.e.
U t,sf(x) := E [f(Xs)|Xt = x] , t ≤ s, t, s ∈ R, (2.2)
it is well defined on the space of continuous and bounded functions Cb(R
d). More-
over, the linear operators U t,r are positivity preserving and satisfy U t,r1 = 1,
U t,t = id.
Proposition 2.1. Let D and B, D ⊂ B be two Banach spaces equipped with a
continuous inclusion D → B and let Li, i = 1, 2, t ≥ 0, be two families of bounded
linear operators, which are continuous in time t. Assume moreover, that U t,ri are
two propagators in B generated by Li, i = 1, 2, respectively, i.e. satisfying
d
ds
U t,si f = U
t,s
i Li,sf,
d
ds
Us,ri f = −Li,sU
s,r
i f, t ≤ s ≤ r, (2.3)
for any f ∈ D, which satisfy
∥∥U t,ri ∥∥B ≤ c1, i = 1, 2. Moreover, let D be invariant
under U t,s1 and
∥∥U t,s1 ∥∥D ≤ c2 Then we have
i)
U t,r2 − U
t,r
1 =
∫ r
t
U t,s2 (L
2
s − L
1
s)U
s,r
1 ds,
ii)
∥∥U t,r2 − U t,r1 ∥∥D→B ≤ c1c2(r − t) sup
t≤s≤r
∥∥L2s − L1s∥∥D→B .
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For a proof see e.g. [18].
Although canonical we need to specify the topological function spaces we shall
be working with. We proceed with the Banach space of real valued continu-
ous functions that vanish at infinity C∞(R
d), equipped with the norm ‖f‖∞ =
supx∈Rd |f(x)|. We moreover denote by C
1
∞(R
d) the space of continuously differ-
entiable functions f ∈ C∞(R
d) such that the derivative f ′ belongs to C∞(R
d) and
equip it with the norm ‖f‖1,∞ := ‖f‖C1
∞
(Rd) := supx∈Rd |f(x) + f
′(x)|. The Ba-
nach space (C1∞(R
d), ‖·‖1,∞) can be continuously imbedded in the larger Banach
space (C∞(R
d), ‖·‖∞). We finally introduce the Banach space (C
2
∞(R
d), ‖·‖2,∞)
of twice continuously differentiable functions f ∈ C∞(R
d) such that the first
derivative f ′ and the second derivative f ′′ belong to C∞(R
d), where ‖f‖2,∞ :=
‖f‖C2∞(Rd) := supx (|f(x)|+ |f
′(x)|+ |f ′′(x)|).
Specific to non-linear Markov processes and mean-field theory are topological
measure spaces. When equipped with the norm ‖µ‖∗ = sup‖f‖
∞
≤1 |(f, µ)| the
space M of finite measures on Rd constitutes a Banach space see [32] Chapter 9,
where (f, µ) =
∫
f(x)µ(dx) represents the duality between the two spaces. We
consider three subsets of M , the unit ball M1 := M1(R
d), the set P := P(Rd)
of all probability measures on Rd, and PNδ . We endow them with the induced
topology of M . We conclude this paragraph by introducing the set of continuous
measure valued functions C([0, T ], M ), respectively, Cµ = {µ ∈ C([0, T ], M ) |
µ0 = µ} with µ := {µs | 0 ≤ s ≤ T} for later purposes. These are also called
measure valued curves.
Next we consider real valued functions or functionals on M and M1, respec-
tively. In this section we only introduce the Banach space (C(M1), ‖·‖C(M1)) of
continuous functions with ‖F‖C(M1) := supµ∈M1 |F (µ)|. Moreover, we specify the
differentiation rule for functionals on M .
Definition 2.2. A function F on the space M of bounded measures on Rd is said
to be differentiable at y ∈ M in the direction of δx, x ∈ R
d, if the variational
derivative δ[y;x]F (or δxF (y)) of F exists, that is the Gaˆteaux derivative (D[y;δx])
of F in the direction of δx, x ∈ R
d:
δ[y;x]F := lim
s→0
F (y + sδx)− F (y)
s
.
Further topologies in the space of functionals on M1 are given in the beginning
of Section 3.
We conclude the collection of definitions and notions in this section with the set
of control laws U := {u : [0, T ] → Rm | us ∈ U for all s ∈ [0, T ]} where the set
U is compact and convex having a C2 boundary.
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Hypothesis A
For the kernel ν(s, x, ρ, u, dy) on [0, T ]×Rd ×M1 ×R
m ×M we assume that:
• (A1) the kernel ν is positive uniformly bounded on [0, T ]×Rd×M1×R
m×M
satisfying ν(s, x, ρ, u, {x}) = 0;
• (A2) the kernel ν is continuous in t;
• (A3) the kernel ν is uniformly Lipshitz continuous in x, µ, and u with
respect to the topologies specified above;
• (A4) The second order variational derivative δ2[ρ,h]ν(t, x, ρ, u) is assumed to
exist in C∞ as a function of h ∈ R
d.
As a uniformly bounded kernel it is uniformly Lipshitz continuous in x, µ, and
u with respect to the topologies specified above. Further regularity conditions
required for optimizing preferences are summarized in Section 4 below.
Solutions to the forward Kolmogorov equation associated with the adjoint oper-
ator AN
∗
to the operator (1.2) can be studied in a strong way or in terms of the
associated propagator, see below. Since we are imposing very strong assumptions,
uniqueness and regularity of a strong solution follow easiest by exploiting known
results from the theory of differential equations on Banach spaces. Optimizing
payoffs is wrapped up in (comes as) a stochastic optimal control problem for a
Markov process. Again we are fishing for more regularity, however, we need to
show that the operator (1.2) generates a Feller propagator, which in particular
possesses the Markov property, to retrieve the process.
The strong conditions collected in Hypotheses A and Section 4 insure the exis-
tence of Markov processes associated with the generators A and AN , respectively,
even in the presence of a feedback control law for pure jump-type generators while
keeping the measure parameter fixed. Our conditions cover the ones in Pliska
(positive ν) [29] and [4]. These authors first address the case where the policy,
in our case the feedback control, is constant in time and only in a later step
introduce the feedback control law.
Proposition 2.3. i) Let M be an open subset in M1 and U ∈ R
m an open
bounded control set. Assume that the kernel ν(s, x, ρ, u, dy) in ( 1.4) is continuous
in [t0, T ] for some t0 ∈ R, of type C
r in x, r ≥ 1, of type Cp, p ≥ 1, in the
parameters ρ ∈M in Gaˆteaux sense, and of type Cq, q ≥ 1, in u ∈ U . Then so is
the unique global flow solving the kinetic equation ( 3.1). An analogous statement
holds for the initial condition µ0 ∈ M1. Since equation ( 3.1) satisfies a linear
growth condition the global flow exists on the whole space.
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ii) Let the kernel ν(s, x, ρ, u, dy) be Lipschitz continuous in x and let the as-
sumptions of part i) be satisfied otherwise. Then the unique global flow solving
the kinetic equation is Lipschitz continuous in this parameter and the conclusions
of part i) remain valid for the other parameters.
The proof of part i) is a direct consequence of Theorems 2 and 7 in [26] CH.
XVIII as well Remark 3 which extends the results to differential equations with
parameters. Existence of the global flow in Banach spaces in the presence of a
linear growth condition is treated in Amann [1], Chapter 2. This reference also
treats the case ii) when we relax the regularity and assume Lipschitz continuity,
only.
Corollary 2.4. Let ν in ( 1.2) be bounded and as in Proposition 2.3 i) except
for the parameter x, which satisfies ii), and consider the linear Kolmogorov back-
ward equations corresponding to the generators A[t, x, ρ, u] and AN [t, x, ρ, u] for
N players. Then the corresponding flows in Rd and RNd, respectively will be
Lipschitz continuous in x.
Lemma 2.5. If Hypothesis A holds, for any given ρ ∈ M1 and u ∈ U the bounded
time-dependent operators A[t, x, ρ, u] and AN [t, x, µN , u] in 1.4 and 1.2 generate
Feller Markov backward propagators Λt,s[x, ρ, u] and ψt,sN [x, ρ, u] on C∞(R
d), in
particular: ∥∥Λt,s∥∥ ≤ c3, 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T,
where ‖·‖ denotes the operator norm.
The proof is a direct consequence of [11] in Theorem 2.2 and Proposition 2.4 of
Chapter 4, see also [20] Chapter 3 and references therein, as will be shown subse-
quently since the measure µN depends on x and the notion of continuity becomes
an issue in contrast to our previous work [3]. The generators are conservative, i.e.
A[t, x, ρ, u]1 = 0 = AN [t, x, µN , u]1, and the generators satisfy a)-c) in Theorem
2.2, namely a) the domains of the bounded operators are dense in C∞(R
d), in
fact D(A[t, x, ρ, u]) = C∞(R
d) = D(AN [t, x, µN , u]); moreover
b) the generators satisfy a positive maximum principle, i.e. for ν ≥ 0, f ∈ C∞(R
d)
and x0 such that f(x0) = supxf(x) the inequality
∫
ν(t, x, dy)(f(y)− f(x0)) ≤ 0
implies for λ > 0∥∥λf −A[t, x, µN , u]f∥∥ ≥ λf(x0)−A[t, x0, µN , u]f(x0) ≥ λf(x0) ≥ λ ‖f‖ ,
and analogously for AN [t, x, µN , u]; finally
c) for λ > max{‖A[t, x, ρ, u]‖ ,
∥∥AN [t, x, µN , u]∥∥} the operators (λ−A[t, x, ρ, u])−1
and (λ − A[t, x, µN , u])−1 are bounded in C∞(R
d) hence the ranges of (λ −
A[t, x, ρ, u])−1 and (λ−A[t, x, µN , u])−1 are dense in C∞(R
d), which finishes the
proof.
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Proposition 2.6. Under Hypothesis A and for any given ρ ∈ M1 and u ∈ U ,
there exist a jump Markov processes generated by A[t, x, ρ, u] and
A
N [t, x, µN , u] in 1.4 and 1.2, respectively, with sample paths in the space of
cadlag functions.
For a proof, see [11], Theorem 2.7 of Chapter 4.
3 Propagators in the Space of Bounded Mea-
sures
In the sequel we investigate the evolution of the laws associated with the N -
player dynamics and the one of the limiting law as the number of players tends
to infinity. They are linked by a weak law of large numbers for processes of pure
jump type which has been derived by Oelschla¨ger [28] Theorem 2 in the absence
of controls. Oelschla¨ger’s proof meets the requirement of jump processes, that
only have cadlag paths, by choosing a different topology compared to the diffusion
case. We proceed by recalling the form of the limiting, so called kinetic equation
for constant control parameter.
Remark 3.1. Under the conditions on the initial distributions given in [28] the
laws of the N-player processes XN converge weakly to the Dirac measure concen-
trated at the solution µt of the integral equation
(f, µt) = (f, µ0) +
∫ t
0
(A[s, ·, µs, u]f, µs) ds
where f ∈ C∞(R
d). Moreover µt is the unique deterministic solution of
d
dt
µt = A
∗[t, µt, u]µt, µ0 = µ, t ∈ [0, T ] , (3.1)
where
A∗[t, µt, u]µt =
∫
Rd
ν(t, y, µt, u, d(x+ y))µ(dy)− ν(t, x, µt, u, dy)µ(dx) . (3.2)
For the sake of more comprehensive notation we fix the control parameter and
drop it while investigating the limiting dynamic.
Corollary 3.2. Let Hypotheses A be satisfied.
i) Then the non-linear flow α induced by the kinetic equation ( 3.1) is twice con-
tinuously differentiable in ρ in variational sense and Lipschitz continuous in the
control parameter u.
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ii) Let ν be uniformly Lipschitz continuous in the measure parameter ρ, only.
For all µ, η ∈ M1 the unique solution to equation ( 3.1) given by Proposition 2.3
is Lipschitz continuous in the initial data i.e:
‖α(0, t, µ)− α(0, t, η)‖∗ ≤ C(T ) ‖µ0 − η0‖
∗ . (3.3)
Proof. Result i) is a direct consequence of Proposition 2.3 with ν Lipschitz con-
tinuous in x, p = 2 and q = 1.
ii) Equation 3.1 is equivalent to:
µt = µ0 +
∫ t
0
A∗[s, µs]µsds. (3.4)
Using Gronwall’s lemma in Banach space we find
‖µt‖
∗ ≤ ‖µ0‖
∗ +
∫ t
0
‖A∗[s, µs]‖ ‖µs‖
∗ ds ≤ ‖µ0‖
∗ ecT ≤ ∞. (3.5)
For the difference
µt − ηt = µ0 − η0 +
∫ t
0
A∗[s, µs]µs −A
∗[s, ηs]ηsds,
since the uniformly bounded operator A is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in ρ,
Gronwall’s Lemma reveals.
‖µt − ηt‖
∗
≤ ‖µ0 − η0‖
∗ +
∫ t
0
‖A∗[s, µs]−A
∗[s, ηs]‖ ‖µs‖
∗ + ‖A∗[s, ηs]‖ ‖µs − ηs‖
∗ ds
≤ ‖µ0 − η0‖
∗ +
∫ t
0
[c1 ‖µs‖
∗ + c2] ‖µs − ηs‖
∗ ds ≤ ‖µ0 − η0‖
∗eCT . (3.6)
We introduce the following topologies for spaces of functionals on the set M1
of measures. Let the subsets Ck(M1) of functionals F such that ‖F‖Ck(M1) :=
‖F‖C(M1) + supµ∈M1
∑k
ℓ=1
∥∥∥δℓ[µ]F∥∥∥
C∞(Rℓd)
is finite. They also constitute Banach
spaces.
Given Hypotheses A let α(t, s), 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T, be the flow in the Banach space
(M1(R
d), ‖·‖∗) guaranteed by Proposition 2.3, then we define
(Φt,sF )(µ) := F (α(t, s, µ)) (3.7)
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for all F ∈ C1(M1). In the sequel we show that Φ
t,s generalizes the Koopman
operator introduced in [25] as the adjoint of a Frobenius Perron operator on a
measure space respectively by [31] in a Hilbert space setting. We call Φt,s the
Koopman-type propagator, or shortly Koopman propagator, induced by α(t, s).
Remark 3.3. Other than in Rk as in [3], where there the Lebesgue measure is
the natural candidate, there is no natural choice which turns M into a measure
space. Therefore, the Koopman propagator ( 3.7) and it’s properties are specified
subsequently.
Lemma 3.4. Let Hypothesis A be satisfied, then Φt,s, 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T , has the
following properties:
1) Φt,s is a linear propagator in C(M1).
2) Φt,s is a contraction propagator in (C(M1), ‖·‖C(M1)).
3) The propagator Φt,s is strongly continuous with respect to ‖·‖C(M1).
Proof. When inserting the definition one immediately sees that Φt,s is linear and
well defined on C(M1) due to Proposition 2.3 and hence is a linear operator.
Exploiting the regularity of the flow α reveals 1). 2) follows form the following
observation ∥∥Φs,tF∥∥
C(M1)
= sup
µ∈M1
∣∣Φs,tF (µ)∣∣ = sup
µ∈M1
|F (α(s, t, µ))|
≤ sup
µ∈M1
|F (µ)| = ‖F‖C(M1)
(3.8)
Hence 3) follows.
In order to show that the family of operators φt,s in (3.7) is a Koopman-type
propagator we will verify that it that it is linear, strongly continuous and that
the propagator is a contraction.
Proposition 3.5. Under the conditions given in Hypothesis A the family of oper-
ators φt,s defines a time inhomogeneous propagator in C1(M1), denoted as Koop-
man propagator in the sequel, as well as C2(M1). The following holds:
i) The Koopman propagator constitutes a family of bounded linear operators in
C1(M1) and C
2(M1), respectively.
ii) The generator of the propagator φt,s in C1(M1) is defined by
A[t, µ]F (µ) =
∫
Rd
A[t, µt](δ[µ;x]F )µt(dx) (3.9)
where A[t, µ] is given in ( 1.4).
iii) The propagator φt,s is strongly continuous in C1(M1) and C
1(M1), respec-
tively.
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Proof. i) Due to Lemma 3.4 the family {φt,s} is a well defined linear operator
on C(M1) and hence on C
1(M1) and C
2(M1). We continue by showing that for
arbitrary 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T the operator φs,t is a bounded operator in the space
(C1(M1), ‖·‖C1(M1)). For F ∈ C
1(M1) we have
δ[µ,x](Φ
t,sF ) =
∫
Rd
(δ[α(t,s,µ);z]F )δ[x]α(t, s, µ(dz)).
Due to the regularity guaranteed by Hypothesis A, duality of the spaces C∞(R
d)
and M1 reveals for all x ∈ R
d:∥∥δ[µ,x](Φt,sF )∥∥C(M1) ≤ ∥∥δ[α(t,s,µ);z]F∥∥C(M1) ∥∥δ[x]α(t, s, µ)∥∥∗ <∞.
where supx∈Rd
∥∥δ[x]α(t, s, µ)∥∥∗ by Hypothesis A. In fact we exploit the constant
given in Corollary 3.2.
Much the same argument holds when showing boundedness of the propagator φt,s
in the space (C2(M1), ‖·‖C2(M )). For every x, y ∈ R
d and F ∈ C2(M1) explicit
calculation reveals
δ2[µ;x,y](Φ
s,tF ) =
∫
Rd
(δ2[α(t,s,µ);z]F )δ
2
[x]α(t, s, µ(dz))
+
∫
R2d
(δ2[α(t,s,µ);z,r]F )δ[x]α(t, s, µ(dz))δ[y]α(t, s, µ(dr)).
A uniform bound for the second order variational derivatives of the solution of
(3.1) is guaranteed by Proposition (2.3), which implies that the Koopman prop-
agator leaves the space C2(M1) invariant. Combining this estimate with Lemma
3.4 finishes part i) of the proof.
ii) According to Proposition 2.3 the flow α(0, s, µ) associated with the kinetic
equation (3.1) exists for all s ∈ [0, T ] and µ ∈ M1. By inserting the definition of
the Koopman propagator (3.7) into the formal definition of a generator, we find
for any µ ∈ M1
(φ0,sF )(µ)− F (µ)
s
=
F (α(0, s, µ))− F (µ0)
s
=
F (µs)− F (µ)
s
=
1
s
∫ s
0
∫
Rd
(δ[µt,x]F )µ˙t(dx) dt ≤ ‖A
∗‖ ‖F‖C1(M1) ‖µt‖
∗ <∞
with operator norm ‖·‖. Here we used the chain rule for variational derivatives,
see Lemma (F.3) in [19] and (3.5). Exploiting duality we conclude that the
infinitesimal generator A[t, µ] is a bounded operator in (C1(M1), ‖·‖C1(M1)) of
the form (3.9).
iii) Strong continuity of φs,t in (C1(M1), ‖·‖C1(M1)) and (C
2(M1), ‖·‖C2(M1)) is a
direct consequence of ii).
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There exists a non-linear Markov process associated with the kinetic equation
(3.1), see [23] where a similar Martingale approach may be used here. For a
definition see [21]. Different constructions also for pure jump cases may be found
in [8, 29].
In order to prove the mean-field limit, i.e. estimate errors, we need to unify
spaces. This is possible since the factor spaces SRNd and the space of N -point
measures PNδ (R
d) may be identified. Consequently we introduce the non-linear
operator
Aˆ
N [t, µN , u]F (µN) := AN [t, µN , u]f(x) (3.10)
on C(PNδ (R
d)) by identification, where as above the empirical measure µN =
1
N
∑N
i=1 δxi ∈ P
N
δ (R
d) ⊂ M1(R
d) ⊂ M (Rd) and x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ R
Nd.
Proposition 3.6. ν satisfies the Hypothesis A and let F ∈ C2∞(P
N
δ (R
d)) then
the operator AˆN [t, µN , u], with µN = 1
N
δx, has the representation
Aˆ
N [t, µN , u]F (µN) =
∫
Rd
A[t, µN , u]δ[x]F (µ
N)µN(dx) + 1
N
∫ 1
0
(1− s)∫
R2d
(
δ2[y]F (µ
N + s
N
(δx+y − δx)), (δx+y − δx)
⊗2
)
ν(t, x, µN , u, dy)µN(dx)ds .
Here δ[y] stands for the variational derivative in the direction δx+y − δx.
Proof. For Y and Y + ζ such that the whole line {Y + θζ | 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1} is in
PNδ (R
d) and F ∈ C2(PNδ (R
d)) the Taylor theorem in M gives the following
representation, see [10] and [19] Corollary F.2:
F (Y + ζ)− F (Y ) =
(
δ[ζ]F (Y ), ζ
)
+
∫ 1
0
(1− s)
(
δ2[ζ]F (Y + sζ), ζ ⊗ ζ
)
ds .
Inserting the Taylor expansion of order 2 under the integral for the choice Y =
δx/N and ζ = (δxi+y − δxi)/N finishes the proof.
We gladly conclude that the first term coincides with the Koopman propagator
(3.7) as N converges to ∞.
Remark 3.7. When restricting the operator AˆN to C2(PNδ (R
d)) in variational
sense the representation in the Proposition 3.6 can be exploited to extend AˆN to
C2(M ) in variational sense. This is essential for the proof of the approximate
Nash equilibrium since the flow associated with the kinetic equation ( 3.1) will
appear in the argument which is not confined to C2(PNδ (R
d)).
Let ψt,sN , 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T , denote the corresponding propagator on C
2(M ).
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4 Optimal Control for a Representative Player
In this subsection we shall specify how preferences are optimized in the mean-field
game. The mean-field game approach proposes that all players are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and the asymptotic optimal control problem,
is of standard type for a single representative agent playing against the overall
mass i.e the mean-field. Optimization is based on the principle of dynamic pro-
gramming and the corresponding HJB equation for the Markov jump processes
associated with the generators A and AN .
Two types of control problems will be covered: One simplified auxiliary cost
function J which does not depend on the state but on the dynamics associated
with the mean-field only. The other type where the state of an individual player
is introduced who is either one of N indistinguishable players, playing against an
N -mean-field of all players, or one player, playing against the mean field. This
player is subject to the limiting dynamics which is assumed to be given by the
operator A in 1.2.
Before reaching the mean-field limit the measure parameter in the dynamics and
the value function is an external parameter even when anticipating the mean-field
µt, t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore optimization of preferences is pursued by traditional
control problems of jump-type with identical cost function though the processes
XN and X differ. Roughly speaking we may control the dynamics of the process
by changing its jump intensity dynamically. We introduce the class of feedback
control laws U as the set of all Borel measurable maps γ : [0, T ]×Rd → U . To
any such γ we associate the jump rate ν(t, x, ρ, γ(t, x), dy). Following Bandini and
Fuhrman [4] and Pliska [29, 30] Theorems 3, 6 probability spaces and filtrations
can be constructed such that XN and X are Markov processes while including
the feedback control. In this section we replace the measure valued parameter
ρ ∈ M1 by a family of measure valued curves {µs : s ∈ [t, T ]}, indexed by time
0 ≤ t ≤ T . We emphasize that it is treated as an external parameter depending
continuously on time t. Hence the assumptions in [4] and [29, 30] hold true. We
skip the details of the construction in those papers.
Let us introduce the function
Θ(t, x, ρ, u) = J(t, x, ρ, u) +A[t, x, ρ, u]V (t, x, ρ),
on [0, T ] × Rd × M1 × U . Adopting the conditions in [4, 12] we introduce the
following collection of Hypotheses:
Hypothesis B
• (B1) Assume that U ⊂ Rm is a compact, convex set with C2 boundary.
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• (B2) The cost function J(t, x, ρ, u) is a bounded real valued function, con-
cave in u, continuous in t, Lipschitz continuous in x, and its Gaˆteaux deriva-
tive in the measure parameter ρ in any direction y ∈ M1 exists for all x ∈ R
d
and u ∈ U and satisfies
sup
ρ∈M1
(
∣∣D[ρ;y]J(t, x, ·, u)∣∣+ ∣∣V T (x, ·)∣∣) ≤ c1 ‖y‖∗ .
• (B3) In addition to the variational differentiability of the bounded operator
A we assume further that the operator norm satisfies;
sup
ρ∈M1
∣∣D[ρ;y]A[t, x, ·, u]∣∣C∞(Rd)→C∞(Rd) ≤ c2 ‖y‖∗ .
• (B4) J(s, x, ρ, u) and A(s, x, ρ, u) are C2 differentiable with respect to the
control parameter u ∈ U ⊂ Rk.
• (B5) Θu(t, x, ρ, u) satisfies a Lipschitz condition in x ∈ R
d, uniformly in t,
ρ and u.
• (B6) The absolute value of the eigenvalues of the matrices Θuu are bounded
above by γ > 0 and, in particular for all y ∈ M1 and feedback control laws
u := γ(t, x; ρ):
sup
ρ∈M1
sup
u∈U
∣∣D2[ρ;y,y]J(t, x, ·, u)∣∣ < c,
The conditions in Hypothesis B are meant to guarantee not only an optimal
payoff but also a Lipschitz continuous optimal feedback control. Let us fix µ ∈
C([0, T ],M1). We proceed by showing existence of a unique solution to the HJB
equation
∂W
∂t
+max
γ
[J(t, x, µt, γ(t, x)) + A[t, x, µt, γ(t, x)]W ] = 0 (4.1)
W (T, x;µT ) = V
T (x, µT ),
on [0, T ]×Rd×C([0, T ],M1) which in a subsequent step will be shown to coincide
with the value function of the type given in (1.8). We proceed by recalling
previous results which we adopt to our setting, see [4, 29]. It is worth mentioning
that Pliska [29] makes use of the theory of non-linear semigroups, developed by
Crandell and Liggett [8], that directly generalizes to propagators.
Proposition 4.1. Let µ ∈ C([0, T ],M1).
i) Under the Hypotheses A and B on the bounded linear operator A[t, x, µt, γ(t, x)]
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and the cost function J(t, x, µt, γ(t, x)) and the terminal data V
T there exists a
unique mild solution W ∈ Cb([0, T ] × R
d × C([0, T ],M1) to the HJB equation
( 4.1) which is almost surely differentiable with respect to t.
ii) Under the Hypotheses A and B and positive jump rate ν there exists a unique
bounded Borel measurable function W on [0, T ]×Rd×C([0, T ],M1)) which solves
the HJB equation ( 4.1), i.e. for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Since µ ∈ C([0, T ],M1) the proof of i) is a direct consequence of Corollary 2.8
[4] and ii) holds since the assumptions of [29] are satisfied. For the proof it is
actually shown that the second term of (4.1) is Lipschitz continuous in W . We
comment on relaxing the extra conditions below.
Remark 4.2. The theory of time dependent Markovian semi-groups has recovered
the results needed for our work. Moreover, shifting the bounded generator A
by a constant in order to make it positive does not change the existence and
uniqueness results but only changes the optimal reward by a discounting. We
therefore conclude that Proposition 4.1 also holds when relaxing the condition
that ν is positive and autonomous.
In view of the previous remarks the assumptions we collected in Hypotheses A
and B match those in both works, moreover, combining the results of Proposition
4.1, uniqueness reveals:
Corollary 4.3. Under the Hypotheses A and B on the bounded linear operator
A[t, x, µt, γ(t, x)] and the cost function J(t, x, µt, γ(t, x)) and the terminal data
V T there exists a unique solution W ∈ Cb([0, T ]×R
d×C([0, T ],M1)) to the HJB
equation ( 4.1).
We are now ready to address existence and in a further step uniqueness of an
optimal feedback control.
Proposition 4.4. Let the Hypotheses A and B on the bounded linear operator
A[t, x, µt, γ(t, x)] and the cost function J(t, x, µt, γ(t, x)) and the terminal data
V T be valid.
i) Then the unique solution of the HJB equation ( 4.1) is equal to the value func-
tion V in ( 1.8), i.e. W = V .
ii) There exists an optimal feedback control γˆ = γˆ(t, x;µ) on [0, T ] × Rd ×
C([0, T ],M1), which is given by any function satisfying
J(t, x, µt, γˆ) +A[t, x, µt, γˆ]V = max
γ=γ(t,x)
(J(t, x, µt, γ) +A[t, x, µt, γ]V ).
The result is a direct consequence of [4] Theorem 2.10, see also [29].
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Remark 4.5. A sufficient condition for an optimal control law to be unique in
case of a maximum payoff problem are convexity of the closed control set U and
strict concavity of Θ(t, x, ·), see Theorem 2.4 in [12].
Under even stronger assumptions we retrieve uniform Lipschitz continuity in the
starting point as will be shown subsequently.
Proposition 4.6. Let γˆ be the unique feedback control on [0, T ]×Rd guaranteed
by Proposition 4.4ii and Remark 4.5 and suppose that Hypotheses A and B hold.
Then γˆ(t, ·) satisfies a local Lipschitz condition, uniformly in t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. The proof follows the general line of arguments given in [12] Lemma 6.3.
However, in [12] the problem was to find a unique minimum, while in our setting
we are looking for a unique maximum. Hence the assumption (B6) is slightly
different.
In the following we want to study regularity in the functional parameter µ ∈
C([0, T ],M1) for the solution of the HJB equation 4.1 and the unique optimal
feedback control γˆ = γˆ(t, x;µ). To this end we introduce µ1,µ2 ∈ C([0, T ],M1)
and vary between the two measures along µα := µ1+α(µ2−µ1) ∈ C([0, T ],M1),
α ∈ [0, 1]. Due to convex optimization the previous existence, uniqueness and
regularity results hold true when replacing µ by µα. For each α ∈ [0, 1] this
involves the notations Aα[t] := A[t, x, µ
α, γ(t, x)], Λt,sα := Λ
t,s[t, x, µα, γ(t, x)], all
parts of Θα := Θ[t, x,µ
α, γ(t, x)],
Vα := V (t, x;µ
α) and γˆα := γˆ(t, x;µ
α), α ∈ [0, 1]. (4.2)
Inserting the functional flow µα into equation (4.1) together with Proposition
4.4ii will lead to the following HJB equation:
∂Vα(t, x;µ
α
t )
∂t
+Θ(t, x, µαt , γˆ(t, x)) = 0 . (4.3)
Smooth dependence of V T (x, µT ) on the measure valued parameter µT ∈ M1
amounts to the existence of a Gaˆteaux derivative with respect to this parameter,
hence amounts by definition to dependence on a real parameter α ∈ [0, 1]. By
assumption (B2), the Gaˆteaux derivatives D[µT ;µ2T−µ1T ]V
T (x, ·) exist in C∞(R
d)
for each x ∈ Rd. Hence the derivative ∂V
T
α
∂α
(.) exist and belong to C∞(R
d). We
have:
V T (x;µ2)− V T (x;µ1) =
∫ 1
0
∂V Tα
∂α
(x)dα (4.4)
with Vα as in (4.2).
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We proceed by showing that the value function V (t, x;µ) given by Propositions
4.1 and 4.4i) is differentiable and uniformly Lipschitz continuous in µ. In a first
step we study smooth dependence of the solution of the HJB equation (4.3) on a
real parameter α.
Lemma 4.7. Suppose the Hypotheses A and B are satisfied, then the solution Vα
of the HJB equation ( 4.3) is differentiable with respect to α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Let us assume that the maximum point of Vα is attained at point γˆα. We
know that Vα(t, x) is a unique classical solution of equation (4.3) hence it is a
mild solution as well and by Duhamel’s principle, see [27], it can be represented
in the following form:
Vα(t, .) = Λ
t,T
α V
T
α (.) +
∫ T
t
Λt,Tα Jα(s, .)ds ∀t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ R
d. (4.5)
Moreover let Vαi(.) = Vαi(t, x;µ
α), Jαi(s, .) = Jαi(s, , x, γˆαi), for any αi ∈
[0, 1], i = 1, 2.
The operator Aα[t] is differentiable in α for each t ∈ [0, T ], and using Proposition
2.1i), we have that for α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1] with α1 > α2,
Λα1 − Λα2
α1 − α2
= 1
α1−α2
∫ s
t
Λt,rα1(Aα1 [r]−Aα2[r])Λ
r,s
α2
dr,
moreover, due to Hypothsis A the generator A[t, x, ρ, u] is twice differentiable and
bounded in the measure parameter ρ to give:∥∥∥∥∂Λt,sα∂α
∥∥∥∥ ≤ limα1→α2 1α1−α2
∫ s
t
∥∥Λt,rα1∥∥ ‖(Aα1 [r]−Aα2 [r])‖∥∥Λr,sα2∥∥ dr ≤ Kmaxr
∥∥∥∥∂Aα∂α
∥∥∥∥
α=α2
where K = T max0≤r≤s≤T
∥∥Λt,rα1∥∥ ∥∥Λr,sα2∥∥ and ‖·‖ denotes the operator norm.
Together with the assumptions that the mappings α 7→ V Tα (.) and α 7→ Jα(t, .)
are both differentiable with respect to the real parameter α for each t ∈ [0, T ]
and the derivatives exist in C∞(R
d), we find that the solution Vα(t, .) in (4.5) is
differentiable with respect to the real parameter α with bounded derivative for
each for each t ∈ [0, T ].
Corollary 4.8. As a direct consequence of the Proposition 4.7 we have that the
solution Vα of the HJB equation ( 4.3) is Lipschitz continuous with respect to
α ∈ [0, 1]. For a proof and more details see [17].
Under the assumptions A and B and the definition of theAα[t], Jα(t, .) and V
T
α (x)
respectively, for any µ1,µ2 ∈ C([0, T ],M ) we get from equation (4.2) and Corol-
lary (4.8), by replacing α1 = 1 and α2 = 0, the following:
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Theorem 4.9. Under the previous assumptions and conditions we have that for
any µ ∈ C([0, T ],M ) the solution of equation ( 4.3) is uniformly Lipschitz con-
tinuous in µ, i.e. for µ1,µ2 ∈ C([0, T ],M ), there exist a constant k ≥ 0 such
that
sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ]×Rd
∥∥V (t, x;µ1)− V (t, x;µ2)∥∥
∞
≤ k sup
t∈[0,T ]
∥∥µ1 − µ2∥∥∗ . (4.6)
The previous results remain valid if we replace the given deterministic curve µ
by a part of it, µ≥t := {µs|µ ∈ C([0, T ],M1), t ≤ s ≤ T} with 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
The unique optimal control γˆ(t, x, µ≥t) is designated to serve as optimal strategy
of an individual player in the construction of mean-field games. In the course of
the construction the optimal feedback control needs additional regularity in the
parameters.
Theorem 4.10. Beyond the assumptions of the previous theorems and results
assume additionally that the resulting unique optimal control
argmax
γ
(A[t, ρ, γ]V (t, x) + J(t, x, ρ, γ))
is continuous in t ∈ [0, T ] and Lipschitz continuous in V uniformly with respect
to t, x, µ. Then given a trajectory µ ∈ Cµ ([0, T ],M ) and a final payoff V
T , the
unique optimal control γˆ = Γ(t, x;µ≥t) defined via equations ( 4.1), is Lipschitz
continuous uniformly in µ i.e, for any η,µ ∈ Cµ ([0, T ],M ):
sup
t,x
|Γ(t, x; η≥t)− Γ(t, x;µ≥t)|≤ k1 sup
s∈[t,T ]
‖ηs− µs‖
∗ , (4.7)
for all t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd.
Proof. The proof is done by combing the assumptions of this Theorem and the
results from Proposition 4.6 and Theorem 4.9.
Remark 4.11. The choice of the parameter µ ∈ C([0, T ],P(Rd)) with start
point µ0 = µ will be determined by a fixed point argument, discussed at the end
of this section. Let us denote the resulting unique optimal control by
γˆ = Γ(t, x;µ≥t). (4.8)
Theorem 4.10 allows us to verify the assumptions of Proposition 2.3, which will
result in well-posedness of the non-linear kinetic equation problem ( 1.7) (or ( 3.1))
where the measure parameter ρ and the control function γ are replaced by µt and
Γ(t, x;µ≥t) respectively.
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The remaining part of this section is to show the existence of a fixed point in the
space of flows of probability measures also denoted consistency condition. For
the resulting unique curve in P(Rd), a set of strategies can be derived using
the optimization procedures explained above. Let C([0, T ],P(Rd)) the set of
continuous probability measure valued functions. The previous set forms a closed
convex subset in C([0, T ],M1), because P(R
d) is a closed convex subset in M1
see [32] and [5]. To any µ ∈ C([0, T ],P(Rd)), one can find the solution of the
Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation
∂V (t, x)
∂t
+max
γ
[J(t, x, µt, γ) +A[t, µt, γ]V (t, x)] = 0, (4.9)
from which one can derive the unique optimal control strategy γˆ(t, x;µ≥t), ∀s ∈
[t, T ], x ∈ Rd. Injecting the feedback optimal control γˆ into the kinetic equation
defines the mapping T : µ 7→ µˆ where
˙ˆµt = A
∗[t, µˆt, γˆ(t, x;µ≥t)]µˆt. µˆ0 = µ, t ∈ [0, T ] , (4.10)
From previous results of Sections 3 and 4 we have that the mapping T : µ→ µˆ
is continuous. By Banach-Alaoglu Theorem we get that the unit ball M1 is a
compact metrizable space with respect to the weak-topology. Together with com-
pactness of C([0, T ],M1), due to Arzela-Ascoli Theorem see [16], and inequality
(3.3), we obtain that T is a compact operator. One completes the proof via
Schauder Fixed Point Theorem.
The mean-field consistency condition is incorporated in the equation
µ˙t = A
∗[t, µt,Γ(t, x;µt)]µt. µ0 = µ, t ∈ [0, T ] . (4.11)
In our applications the solution of the kinetic equation and the control law con-
stitute a fix point. In this case the regularity of the optimal feedback control in
the measure parameter needs to be sharpened from Lipschitz continuity to dif-
ferentiability of order two. The regularization introduced in the Appendix closes
this gap.
5 Law of Large Numbers: ǫ-Nash equilibrium
In Physics and Biology scaling limits and analyzing scaling limits are well estab-
lished techniques which allow to focus on particular aspects of the system under
consideration. Scaling empirical measures by a small parameter h in such a way
that the measure h(δx1+ . . .+δxN ) remains finite when the number N of particles
or species tends to infinity and the individual contribution becomes negligible
allows to treat the ensemble as continuously distributed.
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Scaling kth-order interactions by hk−1 reflects the idea that they are more rare
than k − ℓ order ones for 1 < ℓ < k and makes them neither negligible nor
overwhelming. This scaling transforms an arbitrary generator Λk of a k
th-order
interaction into
ΛhkF (hδx) = h
k−1
∑
I⊂{1,··· ,n},|I|=k
∫
X k
[F (hδx − hδxI + hδy)− F (hδx)]× P (δxI ; dy)
with positive kernel P (δxI ; dy). The N -mean field limit is a law of large numbers
for the first order interactions given by the N -mean field evolutions. For the
special case of pure jump type N -mean field evolutions, cf. (1.2), we prove weak
convergence to the solution of the kinetic equation (3.1) by exploiting properties
of the corresponding propagators. The procedure consists of introducing the
scale h = 1
N
and as explained in Section 3 by unifying space, which is pursued
by substituting f(x) by F ( 1
|x|
δx), where |x| denotes the length of the vector. For
proving an 1/N -Nash equilibrium we admit that one agent has a decision rule
different from the one of the others and give estimates for the errors with respect
to a limiting game. The property exploited for proving the error estimates and
consecutively the N -mean field limit is given in Proposition 2.1.
Let ψt,sN , t ≤ s, be the N -mean-field propagator as in Remark 3.7 and assume that
φs,t is the Koopman propagator defined in (3.7). Since AN is a bounded opera-
tor, the corresponding propagator ψt,sN is bounded as well. Exploiting Proposition
2.1i) we derive an estimate for the deviation of the propagator ψt,sN from the lim-
iting Koopman propagator φt,s on a sufficiently rich class of functionals C2(M1)
forming a core for the limiting generator. We first study the unrealistic case of a
common initial condition µ.
By construction ψt,sN and φ
t,s satisfy the assumptions of Proposition 2.1, which
reveals the representation:
[
(ψs,tN − φ
s,t)F
]
(µ) =
∫ t
s
[
ψs,tN (Aˆ
N [r, µ]−A[r, µ])φs,tF
]
(µ)ds
for F ∈ C2(M1) and µ ∈ P
N
δ (R
d), independent of the control parameter u ∈ U .
We continue by estimating
sup
µ∈PNδ (R
d)
∣∣[(ψs,tN − φs,t)F ] (µ)∣∣≤
∫ t
s
∥∥ψs,tN ∥∥ sup
µ∈M1
r∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣(AˆN [r, µ]−A[r, µ])φs,tF (µ)∣∣∣ ds
≤
(s− t)
N
∥∥ψs,tN ∥∥ ∥∥∥AˆN [r, µ]−A[r, µ]∥∥∥∥∥φs,t∥∥ ‖F‖C2(M1)≤C(T )N ‖F‖C2(M1)(5.1)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T, and Proposition 3.6 was applied in the last step. The constant
C(T ) summarizing the three operator norms and integration with respect to time.
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This estimate will in a further step be applied to estimate the order of convergence
in the mean-field limit. The initial conditions are chosen to suit the operators and
hence differ while N changes. In fact we shall assume that the initial conditions
satisfy
µN0 =
1
N
(δXN,10
+ ... + δXN,N0
), (5.2)
with random variables XN,10 , . . . , X
N,N
0 and that they converge to a law µ0 ∈
P(Rd) in such a way that
∥∥µN0 − µ0∥∥∗ ≤ k1N , (5.3)
with a constant k1 ≥ 0. Let C([0, T ]× U, C
2(M1)) ⊂ C([0, T ]×M1 × U) be the
subspace of continuous functionals J(t, ρ, u), such that J(t, ., u) ∈ C2(M1) for
each t, u.
Lemma 5.1. Let Hypotheses A, B, and Proposition 3.6 be satisfied. Assume
initial conditions 1
N
(δXN1,0 + ... + δXNN,0) as in ( 5.3) and a fixed control parameter
γ ∈ U . Then the following holds: i) For t ∈ [0, T ] with arbitrary T ≥ 0:
∣∣(ψ0,tN,γF )(µN0 )− (φ0,tγ F )(µ0)∣∣ ≤ C(T )N
(
‖F‖C2(M1) + k1
)
with a constant C(T ) independent of γ;
ii) For J on [0, T ]×M1 × U :∣∣∣∣
∫ T
t
J(s, µNγ,s, γ)ds−
∫ T
t
J(s, µγ,s, γ)ds
∣∣∣∣≤ C(T )N
(
‖J‖C([0,T ]×U,C2(M1)) + k1
)
where µNγ,t is the empirical law specified by the propagator ψ
0,t
N,γ and µγ,s is the law
given by the Koopman propagator φ0,tγ or equivalently µγ,s = α(t, s, µ0, γ). For the
N-mean field dynamics the notation reads (ψ0,tN,γJ)(µ0) = J(µ
N
γ,t).
Proof. The bounds hold uniformly for all γ ∈ U . The proof follows the line
argument of the proof of Theorem 5.2 in [3], where the Euclidean unit ball is
replaced by the set M1 respectively the underlying spaces and the norms of the
functionals F and J are specified by their indices.
Let us now turn to the construction of the ǫ-Nash equilibrium. We start with the
following definition.
Definition 5.2. A strategy portfolio Γ in a game of N agents with payoffs
Vi(Γ), i = 1, ..., N, is called an ǫ- Nash equilibrium if, for each player i and an
acceptable individual strategy ui
Vi(Γ) ≥ Vi(Γ−i, ui)− ǫ,
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where (Γ−i, ui) denotes the profile obtained from Γ by substituting the strategy of
player i with ui.
We finally seek approximate Nash equilibria for N -mean field games, N ∈ N, i.e.
we mean to show that deviating from the overall preference γ, which will finally be
determined by the fixpoint in Section 4, does not improve the payoff apart from an
infinitesimal error. Therefore we introduce an additional player with a strategy γ˜
differing from the γ of the remaining players entering the mean-field. We proceed
with another auxiliary one player model, in which the N -mean-field acts as a
single player and the differing preference γ˜ is part of it. This reveals refined
estimates when comparing to the one player game with Koopman dynamics and
uniform strategy γ. The dynamics of the N -mean field with one differing strategy
is given by the generator:
Aˆ
N[t, µN, γ, γ˜]F (µN) =
[
Aˆ
N[t, µN, γ] +AN,1[t, µN, γ˜(t, .)]−AN,1[t, µN, γ(t, .)]
]
F (µN)
(5.4)
where AˆN andAN,1 = A were defined in (3.10) and (1.2), respectively, µN = 1
N
δx,
F ∈ C2(M1).
Remark 5.3. Let ψ0,tN,γ,γ˜ the N-mean-field propagator on C
2(M1) generated by
AˆN [t, γ, γ˜]. Since AˆN is a linear combination of the linear operators A and
AˆN [t, γ] it inherits their properties, i.e. ψ0,tN,γ,γ˜ is a bounded linear Feller propa-
gator and it is Lipschitz continuous in the initial conditions.
Lemma 5.4. Suppose Hypotheses A and B hold and let ψ0,tN,γ,γ˜ and the Koopman
propagator φ0,tγ as above with a class of functions γ : R
+ × Rd → U, which are
continuous in the first variable and Lipschitz continuous in the second one. Then
we recover the estimates given in Lemma 5.1i), ii).
The proof follows the lines of the one of Theorem 6.2 in [3] with M ⊂ Rk,
xN0 , x0, xγ,γ˜ ∈ R
k being replaced by M1, µ0, µ
N
0 , xγ,s, µγ,γ˜,s, µγ,s, where µ
N
γ,γ˜,t is the
empirical law of the process specified by the propagator ψ0,tN,γ,γ˜ and µγ,t is the
solution of the kinetic equation (3.1) with initial value µ0. The norms for the
different spaces have been introduce above.
In order to construct an approximate Nash equilibrium, let the first player have
a differing preference and assume that in this case J depends on the state of a
tagged player, her differing strategy, and the empirical mean. Hence we have to
look at the pairs (XN,1t , µ
N
t ), N ∈ N which refer to a chosen tagged agent and an
overall mass.
Let C2,2∞ (R
d × M1) ⊂ C
2
∞(R
d × M1) denote the subspace of functionals F (x, µ)
on Rd×M1, such that for each µ ∈ M1, the functional F (., µ) ∈ C
2
∞(R
d) and for
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each x ∈ Rd, F (x, .) ∈ C2(M1). Moreover, let C([0, T ] × U, C
2,2
∞ (R
d × M1)) be
the subspace of continuous functionals F (t, x, µ, u) ∈ C∞([0, T ]×R
d ×M1 ×U),
such that for each t, µ, u the functional F (t, ., µ, u) ∈ C2∞(R
d) and F (t, x, ., u) ∈
C2(M1) for each t, x, u.
The generators of the pairs (XN,1t , µ
N
t ) of processes are defined on the space
C2,2∞ (R
d ×M1) and take the form
Aˆ
N
tag[t, x1, µ
N , γ, γ˜]F (x1, µ
N) :=
(
AN,1[t, µN , γ˜] + AˆN [t, µ, γ, γ˜]
)
F (x1, µ
N),
(5.5)
with AˆN [t, µN , γ, γ˜] as in (5.4).
Remark 5.5. i) The propagator associated with the generator AˆNtag will be denoted
by ξ0,tN,γ,γ˜. It possesses the same properties as the propagators Λ and ψ
0,t
N,γ,γ˜ i.e. it
is a bounded Feller propagator, Lipschitz continuous in the initial condition.
ii) Let φ0,tγ,tag the propagator generated by the family
A1[t, µ, γ˜] +A[t, µ, γ] (5.6)
on C1∞(R
d×Rk). Since the operator A1 = A is bounded and more regular in the
parameters than A, the propagator φ0,ttag,γ inherits the properties of the Koopman
propagator φ0,tγ . Here we mention in particular that φ
0,t
tag,γ is a strongly continuous
contraction, Lipschitz continuous in the initial condition.
iii) By inserting ( 5.4) into the definition and by applying Proposition 3.6 we find:
Aˆ
N
tag [t, x1, µ
N , γ, γ˜]F (x1, µ
N) =
(
AN,1[t, µN , γ˜] +A[t, µN , γ]
)
F (x1, µ
N) +O( 1
N
).
(5.7)
For the Kolmogorov equation corresponding to this generator we make the as-
sumption that the initial conditions XN,10 converge to X
1
0 ∈ R
d as N →∞, such
that for k2 > 0 ∣∣∣XN,10 −X10 ∣∣∣ ≤ k2N . (5.8)
Lemma 5.6. Let Hypotheses A and B and the initial conditions ( 5.2) and ( 5.8)
hold. Assume φ0,ttag,γ, ξ
0,t
N,γ,γ˜, and the cost function J to be as above. Then the
following bounds exist for t ∈ [0, T ], T > 0:
i) For F ∈ C2,2(Rd ×M1) we have∣∣∣(ξ0,tN,γ,γ˜F )(XN,10 , µN0 )− (φ0,ttag,γF )(X10 , µ0)∣∣∣ ≤ C(T )N
(
‖F‖C2,2∞ (Rd×M1) + k1
)
with a constant C(T ) not depending on γ˜;
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ii) For J(t, x, µ, u) ∈ C([0, T ]× U,C2,2∞ (R
d ×M1):∣∣∣∣E
[∫ T
t
J(s,XN,1γ˜,s , µ
N
s,γ,γ˜, γ˜(s,X
N,1
γ˜,s ))ds
]
− E
[∫ T
t
J(s,X1γ,s, µs,γ, γ(s,X
1
γ,s))ds
]∣∣∣∣
≤
C(T )
N
(
(T + k2) ‖J‖C([0,T ]×U,C2,2∞ (Rd×M1) + k1
)
,
where the pair
(
XN,1γ˜,s , µ
N
t,γ,γ˜
)
is the Markov process specified by the propagator
ξ0,tN,γ,γ˜, and the component processes X
N,1
γ˜,s is corresponds to A
N,1[t, µt,γ, γ˜]. µs,γ is
the solution to the kinetic equation ( 3.1) with initial condition µ0.
Proof. The proof follows the general line of arguments given in Theorem 5.6 of
[3]. The space {1, . . . , k}×M , where M is a subset of the Euclidean unit ball, is
replaced by Rd ×M1. The appropriate norms are specified above.
The results of this and the previous two sections, and Theorem 5.6 in particular
are based on a feedback control as parameter, depending on time however. The
mean-field game methodology implies that the feedback control depends on the
law of the limiting dynamics respectively the solution of the kinetic equation
and vice versa. Therefore the feedback control has to be twice continuously
differentiable with respect to the measure parameter. The lacking regularity is
compensated by regularization as described in the Appendix.
Let the kernels ν(t, x, µ, dy, γ(t, x;µ)) and ν(t, x,µN , dy, γ(t, x;µN)), respectively,
as before. However, replace γ by the mollified version Φδ[γj], 1 ≤ j ≤ m, de-
fined in the Appendix, which is of C2 type with respect to the measure argument
and define the corresponding generators AˆNtag,δ := Aˆ
N
tag [t, x, µ, dy, γ(t, x; (Φδ[γj])j)]
and Atag,δ := Atag[t, x, µ, dy, γ(t, x; (Φδ[γj ])j)]. The construction insures that the
properties of the corresponding propagators φs,ttag,δ, ψ
s,t
N,δ are preserved. By Propo-
sition 2.1 (ii) we get that
∥∥ψs,tN F − φs,ttag,δF∥∥ ≤ (t− s) sup
t,s∈[0,T ]
∥∥∥(AˆNtag −Atag,δ)φs,ttag,δF∥∥∥
≤ (t− s) sup
t,s∈[0,T ]
(∥∥∥(AˆNtag − AˆNtag,δ)φs,ttag,δF∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥(AˆNtag,δ −Atag,δ)φs,ttag,δF∥∥∥)
(5.9)
and ∥∥∥(AˆNtag − AˆNtag,δ)φs,ttag,δF∥∥∥ ≤ C(w)(ǫ(N) + 1j + δ(j + 1)d)
∥∥φs,ttag,δF∥∥bLip
≤ C(w, t)(ǫ(N) +
1
j
+ δ(j + 1)d) ‖F‖bLip
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where ∣∣γ(t, x;µN)− γ(t, x;µ)∣∣ ≤ ǫ(N) .
From Proposition (3.5) follows that
∥∥φs,ttag,δF∥∥C2(M1) ≤ C ‖F‖C2(M1) in straight
forward manner. Furthermore, using (6) we have that:∣∣(φs,tF )(µ0)− (φs,ttag,δF )(µ0)∣∣ ≤ ‖F‖C2(M1) δtC(w, t).
Hence, we find:
∥∥∥(AˆNtag,δ −Atag,δ)φs,ttag,δ∥∥∥≤ C(w, t)N
∥∥φs,ttag,δF∥∥C2(M1)≤ C(w, t)N ‖F‖C2(M1)
(
1 +
1
δ
)
Hence by choosing j = Nβ and δ = 1
N(1−β)
with β = 1
2+d
we will have that the
rate of convergence will be of 1
N1/(2+d)
+ ǫ(N) order.
Theorem 5.7. Let {A[t, µ, u] | t ≥ 0, µ ∈ M1, u ∈ U} be the family of jump
type operators given in ( 1.4) and µ be the solution to equation ( 3.1). Assume the
following:
i) The kernel ν(t, µ, ut) satisfies Hypotheses A and B.
ii) The form of maxΘ(t, x, µ, u) is given by ( 4.3).
iii) The terminal function V T is in C2,2∞ (R
d ×M1).
iv) The runing cost function J ∈ C([0, T ]× U, C2,2∞ (R
d ×M1)).
v) The initial conditions µN0 =
1
N
(δXN1,0+ ...+δXNN,0) of an N player game converge
in (C2∞(R
d))∗ , as N →∞, to a probability law µ0 ∈ P(R
d) in a way that ( 5.3)
and ( 5.8)are satisfied.
vi) Let µ be the flow of probability measures induced by the solution of the kinetic
equation ( 3.1) and assume that for the strategy profile Γ(t, x;µt) of feedback form
the HJB equation ( 4.3) is satisfied such that Remark 4.11 is valid, i.e. consistency
holds.
Then the strategy profile Γ(t, x;µt), is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in an N player game,
with
ǫ = (
1
N1/(2+d)
+ ǫ(N))(‖J‖C([0,T ]×U,C2,2∞ (Rd×M1) +
∥∥V T∥∥
C2,2∞ (Rd×M1)
+ 1).
Proof. Due to Assumptions i)-iv) the HJB equation of the game with one player
and dynamics given by the generator A in (1.4) and mean field µt given by Corol-
lary 3.2 admits a unique optimal feedback control law Γ = Γ(t, x;µt). By Remark
4.11 the pair (µt,Γ(t, x;µt)) satisfies the mean field consistency condition. Then
the approximate Nash equilibrium follows from the subsequent chain of inequal-
ities, where we exploit the estimates derived previously under the assumptions
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i)-vi). To prove the first inequality we apply Lemma 5.6 ii). Remark 4.11 with
equation (4.8), i.e. the mean field consistency, establishes the second inequality.
The final third inequality is guaranteed by Lemma 5.4i). This reads:
V N(0, xN1,0, µ
N
0 ,Γ) = E
∫ T
0
J(s,XN,1Γ,s , µ
N
Γ,s,Γs)ds ≥ E
∫ T
0
J(s,X1Γ,s, µΓ,s,Γs)ds− ǫ
≥ E
∫ T
0
J(s,X1Γ,s, µΓ,γ,s, γs)ds− ǫ ≥ E
∫ T
0
J(s,XN,1γ,s , µ
N
Γ,γ,s, γs)ds− 2ǫ
= V N(0, xN1,0, µ
N
0 , γs)− 2ǫ
with ǫ given above. Recall that the state dynamics of the first od N players, who
is subject to an N -mean-field, is described in terms of the process XN,1 and that
the state dynamics of the individual player linked to the mean field is described
by the process X1. It is clear that these estimates hold irrespectively at which
time t ∈ [0, T ] the game is started. This completes the proof and the construction
of the mean-field game in this paper.
6 Appendix
For the final result and the construction of the rate of convergence we still need
to show that the optimal control law γ(t, x;µ) is of C2 type in the variational
derivative sense with respect to the measure. We extend the result in [22] from
a finite state space to Rd. In Section 4, we have shown that the resulting unique
optimal feedback control law derived from the HJB equation (4.1) is in the space
of uniformly bounded Lipschitz continuous functions CbLip(Rd), equipped with
the norm ‖f‖bLip = ‖f‖+ ‖f‖Lip , where ‖f‖Lip := supx 6=y
f(x)−f(y)
|x−y|1
, with l1-norm
|y|1 :=
∑
j |yj|. Our aim is to approximate all Lipschitz continuous functions
by twice differentiable ones. In a first step, let us define an arbitrary mollifier
function χ. By definition this function is compactly supported, non-negative,
and infinitely smooth on R with
∫
R
χ(t)dt = 1. Let us define the function φ(y) =∏d
i=1 χ(yi) and also the approximating function
Φδ[f ](x) =
∫
Rd
1
δd
φ(
y
δ
)f(x− y)dy = −
∫
Rd
1
δd
φ(
x− y
δ
)f(y)dy.
Inserting into the definition directly reveals for any δ:
|Φδ[f ](x)− f(x)| ≤
∫
Rd
1
δd
φ(
y
δ
) |f(x− y)− f(x)| dy ≤ dδ ‖f‖Lip
∫
R
|t|χ(t)dt.
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This directly gives ‖Φδ[f ]‖bLip ≤ ‖f‖bLib and
∂xjΦδ[f ](x) =
−1
δd+1
∫
Rd
(
∂zjφ
)
(z)|z=x−y
δ
f(y)dy =
1
δd+1
∫
Rd
(
∂zjφ
)
(z)|z= y
δ
f(x−y)dy.
Together with the first estimate we get ‖Φδ[f ]‖C1 = ‖Φδ[f ]‖bLip ≤ ‖f‖bLib by
direct calculation. For the second order derivatives there holds:
‖Φδ[f ]‖C2 = ‖Φδ[f ]‖C1 +
∥∥∥∥ ∂∂xjΦδ[f ]
∥∥∥∥
bLip
Hence we find:
‖Φδ[f ]‖C2 ≤ ‖f‖bLip
(
1 +
1
δ
∫
Rd
|χ(t)′| dt
)
(6.1)
In the second step we approximate Lipschitz continuous functions with respect
to a measure parameter µ by finite dimensional functionals, which in turn can be
approximated by a twice differentiable functions using the above method. Let F
be a Lipschitz continuous function o n M1. For j ∈ N and k = (k1, ..., kd) with
ki ∈ {0, ..., j}, let x
j
k = (
M
j
)k, be the lattice of (j + 1)d points in [0,M ]d and let
the functions φjk be the collection of (j + 1)
d functions on Rd given by
φjk(x) =
d∏
i=1
χ(
j
M
(xi − ki
M
j
)), χ(t) =
{
1− |t| , |t| ≤ 1,
0, |t| ≥ 1.
The functions φjk are non-negative and, for any j,
∑
k=(k1,...,kd)
φjk = 1. An arbi-
trary point x ∈ Rd can belong to the support of at most 2d functions φjk, that
satisfy the following ∣∣φjk(x)− φjk(y)∣∣ ≤ jM |x− y|1 . (6.2)
Then we can define the subsequent finite-dimensional projections in the space of
functions and measures
Pj(f) =
(j,...,j)∑
k=(0,...,0)
f(xjk)φ
j
k P
∗
j (µ) =
(j,...,j)∑
k=(0,...,0)
(φjk, µ)δ
j
k .
We claim that the corresponding finite-dimensional projections Fj(µ) = F (P
∗
j (µ))
on C(M1), the space of continuous functions on the unit ball M1, converge uni-
formly to F (µ) and it forms a dense subset on it.
Lemma 6.1. The projection Pj has the following properties
29
i) ‖Pj‖ ≤ ‖f‖
ii) ‖Pjf − f‖ ≤ 2
ddM
j
‖f‖Lip
iii) ‖Pjf‖Lip ≤ 2
d+1d ‖f‖Lip
Proof. i) ‖Pj‖ = supf |Pjf | = supf
∣∣∑
k f(x
j
k)φ
j
k
∣∣ ≤ supf supx ∣∣f(xjk)∑k φjk∣∣ ≤
‖f‖
ii) ‖Pj − f‖ =
∑
k
∣∣(f(xjk)− f(x))φjk∣∣ ≤ 2dmax ∣∣f(xjk)− f(x)∣∣ ≤ 2ddMj ‖f‖Lip
iii) Choose an arbitrary x, y. Note that in what is coming the sum is taken
over not more than 2d+1 lattice points, 2d for x and 2d for y. Let k0 be one
of these points. Hence
|Pjf(x)− Pjf(y)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k 6=k0
[f(xjk)φ
j
k(x)− f(x
j
k)φ
j
k(y)] + f(x
j
k0
)
(∑
k 6=k0
φjk(x)−
∑
k 6=k0
φjk(y)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k 6=k0
(f(xjk)− f(x
j
k0
))(φjk(x)− φ
j
k(y))
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2d+1 ‖f‖Lip Mj d jM |x− y|1 ,
with |x− y|1 ≤ d
M
j
.
From Lemma 6.1 we directly get the following result
Proposition 6.2. The function φ and the projection P ∗ satisfy
i)
∥∥P ∗j µ1 − P ∗j µ2∥∥ ≤ 2d+1d ‖µ1 − µ2‖∗ ii) ‖Fj‖Lip ≤ 2d+1d ‖F‖Lip
iii)
∥∥P ∗j µ− µ∥∥ ≤ 2ddMj iv) ‖Fj(µ)− F (µ)‖ ≤ 2ddMj ‖F‖Lip .
Let us write Fj(µ) as a function of (j + 1)
d variables in the following way:
Fj(µ) = fj(
{
(φjk, µ)
}
), aj =
{
ajk = (φ
j
k, µ)
}
.
As a consequence we have that:∣∣fj(aj,1)− fj(aj,2)∣∣ ≤ C ‖F‖Lip ∥∥∥∑(aj,1k − aj,2k )δxjk
∥∥∥
bLip∗
≤ C ‖F‖Lip
∣∣aj,1 − aj,2∣∣
1
,
where C = 2d+1d. Therefore f is a Lipschitz continuous function in u and the
smoothing approximation method above may apply here.
Remark 6.3. The approximation we have presented above can be extended to the
set [−M,M ]d and in general to arbitrary compact subsets of Rd. Consequently,
it holds for the whole Rd.
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